The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual impact of theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana by Douglas, Karen & Sutton, Robbie M.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Douglas, Karen and Sutton, Robbie M.  (2008) The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived
and actual impact of theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana.   Journal of Social Psychology,
148  (2).   pp. 210-221.  ISSN 0022-4545 .
DOI




                                                        The hidden impact of conspiracy theories 1
 
 
Running head:  THE HIDDEN IMPACT OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
 
 
The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual influence of theories 
surrounding the death of Princess Diana 
 
 
Karen M. Douglas & Robbie M. Sutton 
University of Kent 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: 
Karen Douglas 
Department of Psychology 
University of Kent 
Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP 
United Kingdom 




                                                        The hidden impact of conspiracy theories 2
Abstract 
The present research examined the perceived and actual impact of exposure to 
conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana.  Undergraduate students 
rated their agreement with a number of statements about Diana’s death.  They also rated 
their classmates’ perceived agreement with the statements.  From the same 
undergraduate population, a second group of students read some material containing 
popular conspiracy theories about Diana’s death.  They then rated their own and others’ 
agreement with the same statements, as well as perceived retrospective attitudes (i.e., 
what they thought their own and others’ attitudes were before reading the material).  
Results revealed that while their estimates of others’ attitude change were accurate, 
participants underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes were influenced.     
 
Keywords: attitude change or persuasion, conspiracy theories, self-other bias,  
third-person effect  
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The hidden impact of conspiracy theories: Perceived and actual influence of theories 
surrounding the death of Princess Diana 
On Sunday, August 31st 1997, the death of Princess Diana shocked the world.  
Almost immediately after the event, people began to question the incidents surrounding 
the accident that killed her and her partner, Dodi Fayed.  Was the limousine driver 
Henri Paul drunk and, if so, was his dangerous driving a contributory factor in the 
crash?  Did the papparazzi chase the limousine into the Paris tunnel, forcing Henri Paul 
to drive too fast?  Not surprisingly, people wanted to understand the factors that 
contributed to the death of their princess.  However, in addition to plausible 
explanations for the crash, there soon emerged a series of less plausible accounts that 
fall under the banner of the popular term conspiracy theories.  Generally, the conspiracy 
theories surrounding Diana’s death invoke ‘bigger’, more powerful, or more sinister 
explanations for the events than most likely occurred.  For example, one theory 
implicates the British Secret Service in a plot to assasinate the princess.  Another 
suggests that Diana staged her death so that she and Dodi Fayed could retreat into 
isolation (LondonNet, 2005).     
Scholars characterize conspiracy theories as attempts to explain the ultimate 
cause of an event (usually a political or social event) as a secret plot by a covert alliance 
of powerful individuals or organizations, rather than as an overt activity or natural 
occurrence (e.g., McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  Attempts to explain why people believe 
conspiracy theories have focused on people’s need to explain events that are beyond 
their control.  In particular, some researchers view conspiracy theories as a response to 
‘powerlessness’; in the face of increasingly vast and anonymous bureaucratic forces, 
conspiracy theories allow people to come to terms with the possibility that these 
underlying forces shape their future (e.g., Melley, 2002).  Similarly, others view 
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conspiracy theories as a means for less powerful individuals to imagine themselves in 
posession of powerful, or secret information (e.g., Mason, 2002).  The belief in 
conspiracy theories perhaps fulfils people’s need to explain uncontrollable situations 
(McCauley & Jaques, 1979).   
The belief in conspiracy theories is often seen as foolish and illogical (e.g., 
Shermer, 1997; Melley, 2002; Willman, 2000), and indeed the term itself is somewhat 
dismissive or pejorative.  Nonetheless, the popularity of conspiracy theories often grows 
with time and theories also become more elaborate over time (McHoskey, 1995).  
Conspiracy theories surround many other historical and social events such as the origins 
of A.I.D.S. (e.g., Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster & Kilburn, 
1999), and the assasination of President John F. Kennedy (e.g., McCauley & Jacques, 
1979; McHoskey, 1995).  The belief in conspiracy theories is also associated with 
psychological variables such as perceived power.  In particular, the more influence 
African American people believe themselves to have over political processes, the less 
likely they are to believe conspiracy theories against African Americans (Parsons et al., 
1999).  Belief in conspiracy theories among African Americans has also been linked to 
system blame or perceived societal prejudice against them (Crocker, Luhtanen, 
Broadnax & Blain, 1999).  It has also been linked generally to lack of trust (Goertzel, 
1994).  Further, people who believe one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in 
others (Goertzel, 1994).  Given the popularity of conspiracy theories and the 
relationships between belief in such theories and psychological variables, it is therefore 
surprising that little research has examined the psychological impact of exposure to 
conspiracy theories.  That is, to what extent do conspiracy theories actually influence 
people’s attitudes?  Also, are people generally aware of the impact of conspiracy 
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theories on their attitudes, or do they think themselves invulnerable?  We addressed 
these questions in the current study.   
Research on the third-person effect provides a starting point to our research.  
The third-person effect or TPE (Davison, 1983) is the tendency for people to believe 
that persuasive media influence others more than themselves.  Much research has 
replicated this finding in a variety of contexts including politics and news (e.g., Duck, 
Hogg & Terry, 1995) and advertising (e.g., David & Johnson, 1998; Duck, Hogg & 
Terry, 1998, 1999; Gibbon & Durkin, 1995; Gunther & Thorson, 1992; Innes & Zeitz, 
1988).  This research demonstrates that people generally feel ‘others’ to be more 
gullible than the self and that others should therefore be protected from potentially 
damaging attempts to change their attitudes and behaviors. 
While the belief in conspiracy theories may not be considered damaging per se, 
or a direct attempt at influencing people’s attitudes for capital gain or to obtain votes, 
research on the TPE is useful in considering the impact of exposure to conspiracy 
theories on people’s attitudes.  Just like persuasive media such as advertising, people 
may not want to admit that they are influenced by conspiracy theories because this may 
make them appear vulnerable, easily ‘led astray’, or weak-minded to others (Shermer, 
1997).  Admitting that they are influenced by conspiracy theories may also be 
threatening to their self-esteem, just as admitting that they are vulnerable to persuasive 
advertising (Duck & Mullin, 1995; Duck et al., 1995; Perloff, 1989).  Therefore, people 
might be happy to assume that others are influenced by conspiracy theories, but not so 
ready to admit to being swayed by these theories themselves. 
However, recent research demonstrates that, while people may not admit to 
being influenced by persuasive messages, they nevertheless are influenced (Douglas 
and Sutton, 2004).  Even more intriguing, sometimes people appear to be completely 
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oblivious to their attitude change.  Douglas and Sutton examined the perceived and 
actual impact of messages about gun control and global warming.  Results revealed that, 
while people were accurate in judging the attitude change for others, they significantly 
underestimated the extent to which their own attitudes were influenced (see also Bem & 
McConnell, 1970; Markus, 1986; Wixon & Laird, 1976).  They were therefore unaware 
that the persuasive messages had an impact on their attitudes.   
In the current study, we used Douglas and Sutton’s (2004) method to examine 
the perceived and actual impact of conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Princess 
Diana.  To illustrate our procedure, undergraduate students were assigned to a control or 
experimental group.  The participants were drawn from the same population and were 
randomly allocated to the groups, so that the groups did not differ demographically.  
The control group were asked to rate their own (baseline self) and their classmates’ 
(baseline other) perceived agreement with a list of statements about the events 
surrounding Diana’s death.  In the experimental group, participants were first asked to 
read some information containing popular conspiracy theories about Diana’s death.  
They were then asked to rate their own (current self) and their classmates’ (current 
other) perceived agreement with the same items.  In addition to this, they were asked to 
rate their retrospective attitudes (i.e., what they perceive their attitudes to have been 
before reading the material – retrospective self) and the same for their classmates 
(retrospective other).   
Using this design, it was possible to compare the perceived (current – 
retrospective) attitude change for self and others, with participants’ actual attitude 
change (current self – baseline self).  We could therefore assess how accurate 
participants were about their attitude change.  By sampling from the same 
undergraduate student population, our participant group is also the comparison group 
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enabling us to also identify whether participants’ perceptions of others were accurate 
with confidence.  This strategy has been successfully applied to other self-serving biases 
(e.g., Krueger & Dunning, 1999), and contrasts with many other studies that have asked 
participants to compare themselves to broader, remote groups such as ‘other university 
students’ (e.g., Cohen, Mutz, Price & Gunther, 1988, Gunther, 1991; Gunther & 
Thorson, 1992) 1. 
If indeed there is a hidden impact of conspiracy theories, then people should 
perceive their attitudes to be unchanged as a result of exposure to conspiracy theories.  
That is, participants should rate their ‘current self’ and ‘retrospective self’ attitudes to be 
the same.  However, comparing perceived attitude change for others (current – 
retrospective) with participants’ actual attitude change (current self – baseline self) 
should reveal that while people are accurate in judging the impact of conspiracy theories 
on others, that they significantly underestimate their impact on themselves.  They will 
therefore be unaware of the impact of exposure to conspiracy theories on their attitudes.   
 Method  
Participants and design 
 A total of 96 undergraduate students at a British university participated in the 
experiment.  Of these, half were male and half were female.  Participants’ median age 
was 20.9.  Participants were approached whilst at leisure on campus, and were rewarded 
with sweets.  The experiment consisted of a 2 (rated person:  self/other) x 2 (attitude 
rating:  retrospective/current) within-subjects design for the experimental group.  In the 
control group, rated person (self/other) was manipulated within-subjects.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to the control or experimental groups.  As would be expected, 
given random assignment there were no significant differences in the distribution of age 
and gender across conditions. 
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Materials and Procedure 
 Participants in the control group were informed that they were going to be asked 
to read some statements about the incidents surrounding the death of Princess Diana.  
They were also informed that they would be asked to rate their own agreement with 
each statement, and how much they thought other undergraduate students at their 
university would agree with each statement.  The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not 
mentioned.  Participants were then presented with five statements relating to five 
popular conspiracy theories about Diana’s death.  These were taken from a news archive 
on the website: 
(http://www.londonnet.co.uk/ln/talk/news/diana_conspiracy_theories.html).     
These were as follows: 
“One or more rogue ‘cells’ in the British Secret Service constructed and carried 
out a plot to kill Diana.” 
“There was an official campaign by MI6 to assassinate Diana, sanctioned by 
elements of the establishment.” 
“Diana faked her own death so she and Dodi could retreat into isolation.” 
“Business enemies of Dodi and his father Mohammed Al Fayed assassinated 
Dodi, with the death of Diana a cover up for their operation.” 
“Diana had to be killed because the British government could not accept that the 
mother of the future king was involved with a Muslim Arab.” 
For each statement, participants were asked to rate either their own, or others’ 
agreement on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’.  
Those participants who rated their own attitudes first were asked to rate others’ attitudes 
second and vice versa so that order was counterbalanced.  The scale reliabilities for self 
(α = .73) and others (α = .85) were both acceptable in accordance with Nunnally’s 
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(1977) recommendation that a scale alpha of .70 should be considered acceptable in 
social psychological research.  On completion, participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation.   
 Participants in the experimental group were informed that they would be asked 
to read some material about the incidents surrounding the death of Princess Diana, and 
to answer some questions.  At this point, participants were given a sheet of paper 
outlining some points about the incidents surrounding Diana’s death.  This was prefaced 
with the following statement: 
“Many believe that Princess Diana’s death was not an accident.  Additional 
information has been discussed that casts doubt on the conclusion that Diana’s 
death was accidental.  Some of this information is presented below.”  
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in the information.  The information 
that followed was a series of eight points outlining arguments for the position that 
Diana’s death was not an accident.  These were popular conspiracy theories such as the 
concern over the rapid disposal of Diana and Dodi’s bodies, the missing Fiat Uno that 
was said to be involved in the accident, and the suggestion that witnesses heard a bomb 
blast immediately prior to the crash.  For example, one conspiracy theory was worded 
as follows: 
“Immediately after the crash news was broadcast, witnesses appeared on U.S. 
TV saying that they heard an explosion or bang before they heard the car crash.  
Was this a gunshot, or a bomb?” 
After participants read the information, they were presented with the same five-
item scale as for the control group.  Participants were asked to respond to these items 
four times by rating:  (a) their current agreement or disagreement with each statement 
(current self, α = .82), (b) how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement 
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before reading the material (retrospective self, α = .81), (c) how much they think their 
classmates would currently agree or disagree with each statement (current other, α = 
.86), and (d) how much they think their classmates would have agreed or disagreed with 
each statement before reading the material (retrospective other, α = .79).  Again, 
participants were asked to respond to each item on a seven-point scale from 1 ‘strongly 
disagree’ to 4 ‘neutral’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’.  Question order was blocked for ‘self’ and 
‘other’ and then alternated across time (retrospective or current), such that there were 
four different versions of the questionnaire.  In the four versions, ratings were made in 
the following orders: 
1. Self current  self retrospective  other current  other retrospective 
2. Self retrospective  self current  other retrospective  other current 
3. Other current  other retrospective  self current  self retrospective 
4. Other retrospective other current  self retrospective  self current 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four questionnaires and again, there 
were no differences in the distribution of participants’ age and gender across conditions.  
On completion, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
Results 
 The analyses were carried out in accordance with those of Douglas and Sutton 
(2004).  Results for the experimental group were entered into a 2 (rated person:  
self/other) x 2 (attitude rating:  retrospective/current) repeated measures ANOVA.  
There was no main effect for rated person.  Overall, participants did not rate their 
classmates as endorsing the statements about Diana’s death more (M = 2.77) than 
themselves (M = 2.61), F(1, 47) = 1.35, p = .251, η2 = .03.  Results did however reveal a 
main effect for attitude rating, such that mean ratings of agreement with the statements 
across self and others increased from retrospective (M = 2.48) to current (M = 2.90), 
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F(1, 47) = 38.91, p = .000, η2 = .45.  Finally, as predicted the interaction between rated 
person (self/other) and attitude rating, was significant, F(1, 47) = 11.4, p = .001, η2 = 
.20.  All means, standard deviations and significant between-cell differences are 
displayed in Table 1.   
Perceived attitude change for self and others 
We compared current and retrospective attitudes and results revealed that 
attitude change was perceived to occur for others, t(47) = 5.02, p = .000, d = 0.76, and 
the self, t(47) = 2.52, p = .015, d = 0.14.  As expected, the difference scores between 
current and retrospective attitudes for self and others revealed that attitude change was 
judged to be greater for others than the self,  (Ms = 0.71 and 0.15), t(47) = 3.38, p = 
.001, d = 0.75.   
Actual attitude change 
As predicted, participants were more in agreement with the statements about 
Diana’s death in the experimental group than in the control group, t(47) = 5.23, p = 
.000, d = 1.07.  Also, as expected, participants’ perceptions of their own change (current 
self – retrospective self, M = 0.15) were significantly lower than actual attitude change 
(current self – baseline self, M = 0.93); a test of the difference between these scores 
revealed that participants underestimated the extent to which they were influenced, t(47) 
= 13.52, p = .000, d = 0.87. 
Accuracy of attitude change perceptions 
The actual attitude change for the sample (current self – baseline self) was no 
different to the attitude change that participants in the experimental group attributed to 
their classmates (current other – retrospective other), t(47) = 1.57, p = .124, d = 0.20.  
This finding teamed with the finding that participants significantly underestimated their 
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attitude change, is further evidence that participants are more accurate about others’ 
attitude change than their own (Douglas and Sutton, 2004).   
 The experimental group’s retrospective ratings of their attitudes (retrospective 
self) were more favoring of the statements than those of the control group (baseline 
self), t(47) = 4.52, p = .000, d = 0.91.  This suggests that participants misremembered 
what their original attitudes were (cf. Bem & McConnell, 1970; Markus, 1986; Wixon 
& Laird, 1976). 
Discussion 
The current results suggest that there may indeed be a hidden impact of 
conspiracy theories.  While participants in our study were prepared to admit to being 
influenced by conspiracy theories surrounding the death of Princess Diana – the 
difference between ‘current self’ and ‘retrospective self’ attitudes was significant – 
participants significantly underestimated the extent of their own attitude change.  
Participants were therefore unaware of the extent of the impact of the conspiracy 
theories on their own attitudes.  In contrast, their estimates of how much others’ 
attitudes had changed were accurate.  This finding supports research in the TPE 
literature demonstrating that people underestimate the extent of their own persuasibility, 
rather than overestimating the extent of others’ persuasibility (e.g., Cohen et al., 1988; 
Douglas & Sutton, 2004).  This study also replicates the finding that people are 
sometimes unaware, upon exposure to information, that their previous attitudes have 
changed (Douglas & Sutton, 2004; see also Bem & McConnell, 1970; Markus, 1986; 
Wixon & Laird, 1976). 
It is also interesting to note that participants were not only unaware of the extent 
of their attitude change.  Indeed, it also appeared that participants misremembered what 
their original attitudes were because their perceived retrospective attitudes did not 
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match the original attitude ratings given by the control group.  In other words, 
participants inaccurately reported what their retrospective attitudes were.  This 
adjustment was not made for others.  This ‘revision’ of previous attitudes perhaps 
creates the illusion for participants that attitude change occurred less for themselves 
than for others.  Akin to the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), 
participants seemingly misremembered their previous attitudes so that they appeared 
closer to their current attitudes.  Taken together, our findings suggest that the conspiracy 
theories about the death of Princess Diana influenced participants without awareness; 
while participants perceived themselves to be relatively invulnerable when they were 
clearly not, they were more than happy to suggest that others members of their class 
were more influenced.   
In replicating the results of Douglas and Sutton (2004) in the domain of 
conspiracy theories, the current research extends previous work to a different form of 
social influence.  Here, the information given to participants is unlikely to change their 
behavior.  However, participants still underestimated the extent to which they were 
influenced.  Previously, this bias had only been demonstrated for blatant influence 
attempts such as messages about global warming (attempts to persuade people to 
conserve fuel; Douglas & Sutton, 2004) and defamatory messages about politicians 
(attempts to influence voting behavior; Cohen et al., 1988).  Therefore, from these 
results we can conclude that the underestimation of personal influence extends beyond 
intentionally persuasive content domains.  Perhaps people more generally assume that 
they are resistant to attempts to persuade them.   
So, how far would this bias extend?  Future research may be designed to 
examine other areas where people are unaware of the influence they experience.  In 
particular, while our results extend previous findings to conspiracy theories (a new 
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content domain), future research may also examine new media.  For example, the 
Internet is a venue of many concerted attempts to influence the public, by interests 
ranging from companies attempting to sell products to right-wing and racist groups 
attempting to recruit new members.  Research suggests that people are concerned about 
the influence of this material (e.g., Beckles, 1997; Zickmund, 1997), and respond 
strongly to it (e.g., Douglas & McGarty, 2001, 2002).  However, beliefs about the 
impact of harmful Internet messages on self and others, and the actual impact of this 
material on people, have not yet been investigated. 
Future research might also investigate the underlying mechanisms that lead 
people to underestimate the extent to which they are influenced by conspiracy theories 
and other forms of influence.  In the TPE literature, the assumption that others are more 
influenced than the self has been linked to a motivation to maintain positive self-esteem 
(e.g., Duck & Mullin, 1995; Duck et al., 1995; Perloff, 1989).  Perhaps therefore, 
denying the true extent of influence on the self might protect people from losing ‘face’ 
with others, or from feeling gullible.  Both are likely to have an impact on self-esteem.  
The extent to which it is normatively acceptable to be influenced by media content has 
also been linked with the TPE (Duck et al., 1999).  It may be normatively unacceptable 
to admit being influenced by elaborate and illogical conspiracy theories, and this could 
potentially explain why people do not admit the full extent of their personal influence.   
Finally, our findings call into question current theorizing about the function of 
conspiracy theories.  If indeed conspiracy theories are a means to provide explanations 
for uncertain events (Melley, 2002), or are a response to powerlessness (e.g., Melley, 
2002; Mason, 2002), then it is perhaps surprising that people are not prepared to fully 
accept that they have been influenced by them.  We may expect people to be reluctant to 
agree that they are influenced by advertising because it has a material impact on their 
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lives, but if conspiracy theories are adaptive, then why are they so widely dismissed as 
foolish and controversial?  Future research may therefore attempt to uncover other 
reasons why people overtly reject conspiracy theories but perhaps privately accept them 
to be true.  Related to this, it would be useful to examine the potential impact of 
conspiracy beliefs on other socially significant variables such as locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966), and just world beliefs (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lipkus, Dalbert & Siegler, 
1996; Sutton & Douglas, 2005).   
In summary, the current study provides a first examination of the real impact of 
conspiracy theories.  Indeed, conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana were 
influential on our British participants.  However, these very participants were oblivious 
to the impact that these conspiracy theories had on their attitudes.  They correctly 
assumed that others from the same demographic as themselves were influenced but 
denied the full extent of influence on themselves.    
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Author note 
The authors thank Lisa Huggins who collected the data for this study. 
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Footnotes 
1. Douglas and Sutton (2004) used both a cross-sectional design 
(control/experimental groups) as in the current study, and a longitudinal design 
where one group of participants was tested in two phases.  Their findings were 
the same using both methods.   
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Table 1.  Mean (and standard deviation) control, retrospective and current attitudes 
towards for self and other.  Higher values indicate greater rated endorsement of 
the statements. 
                 Attitude rating 
  Control     Retrospective   Current     Perceived  Actual 
          attitude change  attitude change 
              ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Self 1.75 (0.62)aa 2.53 (1.05)b  2.68 (1.06)dd    0.15 (0.40)f  
Person                                               0.93 (1.21 )g 
Other 2.15 (0.75)c 2.42 (0.84)bc  3.13 (1.01)ee    0.71 (0.98)g 
              ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Means that share a subscript are not significantly different at p < .05.  
